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Criminal Law and the European
Communities: Defining the Issues
Dr. Christine Van den Wyngaert*

INTRODUCTION
Within the complicated network of European organizations,' the European Communities 2 are unique, constituting the prefiguration of a federal
state. The idea of a "European union" between the member states may be
a distant political utopia, particularly because of the great difficulties
which have emerged over the past few years. However, the system created
in the 1950s bears many characteristics of a federal system, at least insofar
as certain economic matters are concerned. 3 With respect to these matters,
the treaties establishing the European Communities have introduced supranational legislative, executive and judicial authorities, 4 the acts of
which are directly applicable in each of the member states. 5
In this "prefederal" configuration, problems have materialized which
find no direct solution in the treaties. One of these problems concerns the
criminal law. Having focused on the aim of promoting and ultimately
realizing economic integration between the member states, the treaties establishing the European Communities have not dealt with matters which
would have been regulated if political integration had been the immediate
purpose. Criminal law and criminal procedure are among these matters. 6
The Communities' failure to address issues of criminal law and procedure has raised problems in a number of cases. The commercial policy of
the Communities, including the payment of premiums, subsidies and refunds, has paved the way to certain forms of fraud and abuse which are
not proscribed by the domestic penal laws of the member states. Because
certain crimes, such as obtaining financial aid by false pretenses, tax fraud
or the corruption of civil servants, are in general punishable only if committed against national interests, it is possible for similar crimes committed
against corresponding Community interests to go unpunished because
* Senior Research Associate at the International Criminal Law Center of the Free University of Brussels.
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they do not fall within the definitional scope of the national prohibition.
Conversely, while national prohibitions may encompass the violation of
a Community rule, the sanctions provided for may be so different from one
state to another that their infliction distorts competition between the
member states and therefore impinges upon one of the basic policies of the
Communities.
The progressive disappearance of intra-European frontiers, facilitating
and stimulating the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital
within the Communities, has also been beneficial to offenders who take
advantage of the continued political fragmentation of the states constituting the Communities. As the integration of criminal law and procedure
does not fall within the competence of the Communities, 7 relations between member states in criminal matters are based, not upon integrationbut
on cooperation, by means of essentially bilateral techniques such as extradition, judicial assistance, and transfer of criminal proceedings. Despite the
strong political and economic links between the member states, the rules
and principles governing these techniques of mutual cooperation have
hardly outgrown the traditional premises based on state sovereignty,
which were laid down in the last century. This is evidenced by the fact that
most of the classical barriers to extradition and cooperation in criminal
matters still exist: reciprocity, double criminality, non-extradition of nationals, the political offense exception, the exception of fiscal and economic
crimes.
These impediments, which may seem somewhat anachronistic in a region aiming at an ever growing economic, and ultimately political 8 integration, often paralyze national efforts to suppress crime and strongly
hamper the development of a common criminal justice policy. It is not
surprising that the present situation favors the commission of certain,
mainly "economic crimes." 9 At the same time, it attracts certain offenders,
not only the ideologically motivated "terrorists" claiming the benefit of the
political offense exception, 10 but also common criminals from outside
Europe finding the region an attractive and profitable carrefourfor trafficking
drugs, stolen works of art and the like. 11
While the development of a common criminal justice policy lies more
within the general objectives of the Council of Europe, of which all states
composing the European Communities are members, there are nevertheless
a number of problems which are specific to the Communities and which
may call for a special response on their part. This article makes a short tour
d'horizon of the different issues at stake and briefly describes the efforts
which have been or are being undertaken to resolve them. 12
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THE IMPACT OF COMMUNITY LAW ON
DOMESTIC PENAL LEGISLATION
The criminal law as such is not within the competence of the Communities. 13 Because the travaux preparatoiresof the treaties establishing the European Communities are secret, it cannot be determined with certainty
whether or not this omission stems from a deliberate choice. 14 As observed by Paul de Keersmaeker in his report on behalf of the European
Parliament, it seems that the drafters of the treaties, in their enthusiasm
for making rules for the creation of a new legal order, have overlooked
some of the problems involved in the enforcement of these rules. 15 This
is quite understandable from a psychological perspective. 16 In addition,
the misadventure of the European Defense Community, in which the
creation of a supranational criminal law system for military offenses had
been envisaged, 17 may have influenced the drafters to refrain from dealing
with criminal law matters. The failure to transfer any legislative competence in penal matters to the Communities could also be explained by the
unusual institutional setting. Under most democratic constitutions, this
particular competence belongs to a directly elected legislative body or
parliament. It is therefore difficult to see how even part of this competence
could have been transferred to the Communities-whose legislative organ
is not the European Parliament but rather the Council of Ministers-which
is concurrently an executive organ. 18
Since it is clear that the Communities lack legislative competence in
criminal matters, criminal law has remained within the exclusive competence of the states. However, while the Communities are not competent
to criminalize behavior which adversely affects them, Community law
nevertheless may have some impact on the domestic penal laws of the
member states. This is particularly evident in the case of a conflict between
Community law and national penal law. 19 It is generally accepted that in
case of such conflict, Community law takes precedence. 20 There is also no
doubt that the national penal laws are subjected to this principle and that
national judges must therefore refrain from applying domestic penal
provisions which violate Community law. Accordingly, while the Communities are not competent to create new penal legislation, they can nevertheless block the application of domestic penal legislation if the latter
appears to be incompatible with Community law. 21 In other words,
whereas the scope of national penal law generally cannot be broadened by
Community law, it can be considerably narrowed. 22
Although states are in principle free to determine which measures they
deem appropriate to ensure the fulfillment of their obligations arising out
of the treaties or resulting from action taken by Community institutions,
the aforementioned principle may nevertheless affect the scope of national
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discretion when Community law is implemented. This has unequivocally
been accepted by the Court of Justice of the European Communities which
consistently holds that national penal or administrative sanctions should
not go beyond what is strictly necessary. In its preliminary ruling in the
CaSati 23 case, rendered on November 11, 1981, the Court said:
In principle, criminal legislation and the rules of criminal procedure are
matters for which the Member States are still responsible. However, it is clear
from a consistent line of cases decided by the Court, that Community law
also sets certain limits in that area as regards the control measures which it
permits the Member States to maintain in connexion with the free movement
of goods and persons. The administrative measures or penalties must not go
beyond what is strictly necessary, the control procedures must not be conceived in such a way as to restrict the freedom required by the Treaty and
they must not be accompanied by a penalty which is so disproportionate to
the gravity of the infringement that it becomes an obstacle to the exercise
of that freedom. 24
Accordingly, the Court has considered certain domestic criminal provisions to be contrary to the principle of proportionality or to the principle
of non-discrimination, both protected under Community law. For example, in Cayrol v. Rivoira, 25 two businesses had been fined by a French court
for having imported prohibited goods (table grapes, allegedly from Italy
but in reality from Spain) into France. They were jointly sentenced, inter
alia, to pay a fine of over 500,000 FF in lieu of confiscation and a fine
amounting to four times the value of the goods liable to confiscation (over
1.000.000 FF). The European Court of Justice considered these fines to be
disproportionate, taking into account the purely administrative nature of
the contravention. In its preliminary ruling, the Court held:
Any administrative or penal measure which goes beyond what is strictly
necessary for the purposes of enabling the importing Member State to obtain
reasonably complete and accurate information on the movement of goods
falling within specific measures of commercial policy must be regarded as a
measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction prohibited
by the Treaty. 26
The practical, quantitative importance of this "smiling face of Community law" 27 (the effect of which, to a certain extent, is comparable to
that of the European Convention on Human Rights) 28 should not be
overestimated. The narrowing effect of Community law vis-A-vis domestic
penal provisions applies only to matters which fall, directly or indirectly,
within the scope of Community law. Beyond this, national penal law
retains all of its severity. 29 For example, in Casati a person was charged
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with unauthorized exportation of money from Italy. Under Italian law, this
contravention is punishable by a term of imprisonment of one to six years
and a fine of between two and four times the value involved. In its preliminary ruling in this case, the Court, after having confirmed its former ruling
concerning the limits imposed on national penal law by Community law,
nevertheless held that this rule was not applicable in the present case
because the monetary operation under consideration did not fall within the
scope of Community law. 30
In three situations, Community law has had the effect of broadening the
scope of a domestic penal provision. For example, Article 194 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom")
obliges each member state to treat any infringement of the duty of secrecy,
as defined in the article, as a corresponding national violation. 31 This
provision was necessary because violation of Euratom secrets would not
normally fall within the scope of the definition of a violation of security
secrets under national laws. Therefore, states are required to broaden the
application of their domestic law to include violations of Euratom secrets,
or, in other words, to assimilate the "Community offense" to the corresponding national offense. A similar assimilation has been prescribed by
Articles 3 and 27 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European
Economic Community ("E.E.C.") and the corresponding articles in the
European Coal and Steel Community ("E.C.S.C.") and Euratom Statutes. 32 Article 3 concerns the prosecution of a judge of the Court of Justice
before a national court after his immunity has been suspended by the
Court of Justice. 33 Article 27 relates to perjury before the Court of Justice
and obliges member states to assimilate this crime to perjury committed
before national courts. 34
In the three situations mentioned, member states assimilate the "Community violation" with the corresponding domestic infringement, but no
provision is made to determine which national law will be applicable in a
particular case. Accordingly, all member states are equally competent in
case of a violation, and the penal laws of each are simultaneously applicable. 35 As there is no provision establishing priority of jurisdiction, or a
provision concerning non his in idem, the possibility of two or more consecutive prosecutions and/or condemnations for the same violation exists. So
far, however, the problem of double jeopardy only exists theoretically,
since there have been no practical applications of these articles to date. 36
The situation is nevertheless quite exceptional. As Johannes has pointed
out, it is from the viewpoint of the penal jurisdiction of states ratione loci,
a case of regional universaljurisdiction in which all member states are simultaneously competent vis-a-vis certain offenses against the Communities. 37
Johannes has also drawn attention to the fact that the theoretical foundation of this particular jurisdiction is from the Communities' viewpoint to
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be explained by the protective principle, while from the perspective of the
member states it is the universality principle. 38 This is especially the case for
violators of the Euratom secrets, in respect of which the locus delicti can be
any place in the world. 39

COMMUNITY SANCTIONS: PENAL IN NATURE?
A more practical question is whether the sanctions imposed by the Communities for certain infringements of the E.C.S.C. Treaty or of the E.E.C.
regulations on competition law are to be considered as penal sanctions. 40
If the answer is yes, one might conclude that there is a penal law of the
Communities for the substantive matters in question. The question is
highly debated, although there seems to be a majority opting for the
non-penal character of Community sanctions. 41
While the treaties themselves are silent on the subject, it is highly
improbable that the drafters intended to transfer any penal competence
whatsoever upon the Communities. 42 Inaddition, the Council regulations
for the implementation of the Communities' antitrust policy have explicitly provided that the sanctions (penalties and periodic penalty payments)
are of a non-penal nature. 43 Is this assertion to be considered as a fiction,
as some authors argue, 44 or "une sauce pourfaire passerle poisson"? 45 There are
arguments on both sides, a detailed discussion of which, however, would
go beyond the scope of this article. 46 The least one can say is that the
situation is rather ambiguous, which is also the conclusion of De Keersmaeker in his report on behalf of the European Parliament. 47
While there may have been a number of arguments for recognizing the
penal character of these sanctions, 48 the Communities have probably
opted for the most pragmatic solution by considering them non-penal,
administrative sanctions. 49 As such, a number of delicate problems have
been avoided, including the penal responsibility of corporations and the
enforcement of the sanctions by the member states. 50 The recognition of
the penal character of Community sanctions could also mean that the
procedure before the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 172 of the E.E.C.
Treaty would be considered a penal procedure. 51 Thus, it could be argued
that the guarantees applicable in criminal procedure 52 would apply. 53
This might be overly protective, given that the type of behavior which is
contemplated by the antitrust policy of the Community is mainly economic delinquency. 54
Some authors believe that the Court of Justice has implicitly recognized
the penal character of the sanctions by applying general principles of
criminal law to the antitrust sanctions, including the principle of proportionality, the principle non his in idem and the principle requiring that the
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action taken by the Commission should be barred by a statute of limitations. 55 Others submit that this is not per se an indication of the penal
character of Community sanctions, as the same principles have been applied to civil and commercial cases. 56 Even if one accepts that the sanctions
infficted by the Communities are penal in nature, the quantitative importance of the "transnational penal law" 57 developing from the Communities is nevertheless restricted: it can develop only with respect to the very
limited category of acts susceptible of being sanctioned by the Communities. 58

THE PENAL ENFORCEMENT OF COMMUNITY
LAW BY THE MEMBER STATES
As the competence of the Communities to lay down penal sanctions for
the enforcement of Community rules has not been recognized so far by the
Communities or the member states, the implementation of these rules is
left to the discretion of member states, who are free to choose the appropriate measures for the fulfillment of their obligations arising under the
treaties. 59 These measures can be penal or non-penal in nature. As explained above, this freedom of discretion is restricted only by the principle
that domestic sanctions implementing Community legislation should be
limited to that which is strictly necessary. 60
It is clear that discrepancies among national measures enforcing Community rules may have undesirable results. Major differences in criminal
procedure and in the severity of the sanctions (imprisonment, fines,
professional interdiction), even if the principle of proportionality is respected, may distort competition and thus impinge upon one of the fundamental rules of Community law. Therefore, the need for a harmonization
of certain national implementation and enforcement measures of community legislation has been emphasized. 61 There is, however, much discussion about the legal foundation under Community law of such a
harmonization. 62 Consequently, it is unlikely that the problem will find
a solution in the short run.
In addition to this problem, there are serious lacunae, inherent to a system
leaving the penal enforcement of Community legislation to the discretion
of member states. These lacunae are: (i) lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae;
(ii) lack of jurisdiction ratione loci and (iii) lacunae in the current system of
interstate cooperation in criminal matters.
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Lack of Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae
In most states, crimes which can be gathered under the broad denomination "economic crimes" (including tax fraud, embezzlement of public
money, corruption of civil servants, abuse of regulations concerning the
agricultural market, and obtaining financial aid from the government by
false pretenses) 63 are usually punishable only if they are committed
against national interests. Accordingly, the member states of the European
Communities are not, in normal circumstances, legally equipped to punish
similar, factually corresponding crimes committed against the interests of
another member state or the Community. For economic crimes against the
interests of another member state, this means that there is a relative vacuum
juris, in the sense that the crimes in question are punishable only under the
law of the state which is affected. For economic crimes against Community
interests, the vacuum jurismay be absolute, in that the crimes in question may
not be punishable at all because the constitutive elements of the crime fall
outside the definitional scope of national statutes. As such, prosecution
and punishment by the member states may be impossible. 64 States can,
of course, remedy this situation by unilaterally adapting their national
legislation; in that case they broaden the scope of their corresponding
domestic penal provisions so as to encompass infringement of Community
interests. 65

This solution would correspond to the one laid down by the Euratom
Treaty provision concerning violations of Euratom secrets and by the
provision on false testimony contained in the Statute of the Court of
Justice. 66 It is the process known as assimilating the Community offense
with the corresponding national offense. 67 This process, however, has a
number of drawbacks. As was pointed out above, it creates the risk of
double jeopardy. 68 The unilateral determination of sanctions for Community offenses could also lead to discrepancies between national standards of severity for the same offense which is likely to distort competition
within the Communities. Furthermore, the "domestication" of Community offenses deprives them, to a great extent, of their stigma as offenses
against the interests of the Communities. 69 All of these drawbacks suggest
that the problem of penal enforcement of Community law should be
regulated on the level of the Communities, instead of on the level of the
member states. As the Communities themselves seem to lack the competence for issuing such legislation, 70 they are presently studying the legal
basis on which a common system for the suppression of Community
crimes could be developed. 71
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Lack of Jurisdiction Ratione Loci
As a rule, states are competent only vis-a-vis offenses which have been
committed on their territories. The territoriality principle is accepted by all
member states as the most important legal basis for the exercise of penal
jurisdiction. 72 Other principles supplement this basis of jurisdiction. The
most important is the personality principle, which allows states to judge
their nationals for certain offenses they have committed abroad. 73 However, the applicability of this principle does not normally extend to the
economic crimes which confront the Communities. 74 In some member
states, including Great Britain, the personality principle applies only to the
crimes for which it has been expressly provided; these do not include most
economic crimes. 75 Most other member states accept a more general application of the personality principle but have laid down restrictions which
exclude economic crimes: double criminality; 76 minimum standard of severity of the sanction; 77 requirement of a complaint of the victim or official
notice of the state where the offense was committed; 78 requirement of the
presence of the offender; 79 and the like. 80
Turning to the other principles of jurisdiction, the protection principle,
governing mainly crimes against the state, 81 is without relevance for economic crimes, while the universality principle, applicable to the most
serious international crimes, 82 does not, so far, 83 offer a jurisdictional
basis for the suppression of economic crimes. Accordingly, it is possible
that a member state, while being competent ratione materiae vis-a-vis a given
offense, nevertheless lacks the necessary jurisdiction rafione loci to judge the
case and eventually punish the offender. 84
Different solutions to this problem have been suggested. Johannes advocates the introduction of a system of a regional, European universal
jurisdiction, an extended application of the territoriality principle; 85 conversely, Mulder has pleaded for an extended application of the personality
principle. 86 It has also been submitted that an improvement of the system
of extradition and judicial assistance could fill most of the loopholes. 87
These and other solutions have been envisaged in the two draft Protocols
which are presently under discussion. 88

Lacunae in the Current System of Interstate
Cooperation in Criminal Matters
Most member states of the European Communities are linked, bilaterally
of multilaterally, by treaties of extradition and judicial assistance. Other
forms of cooperation in criminal matters, such as transfer of criminal
proceedings, execution of foreign penal judgments and transfer of sentenced offenders, have hardly been developed. 89 As instruments of an
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international criminal justice policy, the further elaboration of these procedures on a multilateral basis is to be expected from the Council of Europe,
rather than from the European Communities. 90
There are, however, a number of obstacles to inter-state cooperation in
criminal matters which have greater impact within the Communities than
within the Council of Europe, because of the particular activities for which
the Communities constitute a pre-federal entity, that is to say economic
integration and crimes relating to this policy. It is precisely for these
economic crimes that the current barriers to extradition and judicial assistance exert their obstructing effect, as many of these barriers, either per se
(the exception for fiscal offenses) or for other reasons (lack of double
criminality, lack of jurisdiction ratione loci, non-extradition of nations) exclude the use of the procedures for the crimes in question.
While extradition may not be the appropriate instrument for economic
crimes, 91 non-extradition nevertheless has the undesirable result of leaving the offense unpunished, since the state which refused extradition usually lacks the jurisdictional basis (rationemateriae and/or loci) to prosecute the
offender. 92 A possible solution would be the transfer of the criminal
proceedings by the state where the offense was committed to the state
which denied extradition. However, in the present state of the law, this
possibility seldom exists. 93
Even in those cases where the prosecuting state has jurisdiction, proceedings may be paralyzed by a refusal to grant judicial assistance on one
of the grounds listed above. As economic crimes against Community interests may be committed on the territories of more than one member state,
judicial assistance may be essential to the prosecution's case. This is particularly true if the state of residence of the offender is not the state where
he committed the crime. In many cases economic crimes can be established
only after an examination of the corporate books and accounts of the
alleged offender (usually in his state of residence). 94 Thus, prosecution in
the state where the crime was committed may require extensive judicial
assistance from the state of residence. A refusal to assist may block the
proceedings and leave the offender unpunished.
Finally, if proceedings are successful and the offender can be convicted
in the state where the offense was committed, the execution of the sentence may still be rendered impossible by the fact that the offender resides
in another state. 95 Execution of the sentence in the state of residence could
be a workable solution, but the present law usually does not provide for
such an outcome. 96 As extradition in these cases is usually both impossible
and inappropriate, the offender, again, will go unpunished. All these loopholes taken together have made the Communities a "paradise for economic
criminals." 97
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EFFORTS TOWARD THE COMMON PREVENTION
AND SUPPRESSION OF CERTAIN OFFENSES
AGAINST COMMUNITY INTERESTS
In 1962, a working group composed of governmental experts of the member states and civil servants of the Communities was established to discuss
the problem of investigating and suppressing violations of Community
regulations, directives and decisions. They elaborated a draft convention,
which was elaborate and rather ambitious: there were sixty-seven articles
divided over seven chapters, covering such areas as jurisdiction, judicial
assistance, execution of penal sentences and such matters as pardon,
amnesty, and trial in absentia. 98 Priority of jurisdiction was given to the state
of which the offender was a national or a resident (personality principle).
The convention provided for the execution of both prison sentences and
pecuniary sanctions.
The work on the draft was nearing completion when, in 1966, the
French refused any further cooperation. The French delegation argued, inter
alia, that the cooperation between member states envisaged in the draft
convention had not been contemplated by the Treaty of Rome. Some
provisions were unacceptable to France as they implied a considerable
infringement of certain sovereign rights, including the right to pardon
offenders. 99
After questions were raised in the European Parliament, i00 the problem
was reexamined in 1971 by the Ministers of Justice of the member states
at their meeting in Luxembourg; they invited the Commission of the
Communities to study the problems of criminal law in the economic sphere
and to submit new proposals. 101 Thereafter, the Commission established
a new working group which drew up the preliminary drafts of two new
conventions: one concerning penal protection of the financial interests of
the Communities, and the other concerning penal responsibility of civil
servants of the Communities. Both drafts were subsequently submitted to
the European Court of Justice for its opinion, which was delivered in
1975. 102 They were then transmitted to the Council of Ministers 103 where
they have been under consideration ever since. 104
The first draft convention, the Protocol Concerning the Penal Protection
of the Financial Interests of the Community, 105 focuses on a system of
transfer of proceedings. The offenses to which it applies are: (a) all infringements of the treaties (E.C.S.C., E.E.C. and Euratom), provisions
adopted by the Community institutions in application of the treaties and
provisions adopted by the member states for the implementation of Community law (provided the infringements are susceptible of penal sanctions
in the member states); and (b) the new offenses created by articles 14 and
15-in general terms, unlawful reduction of Community revenues, refunds
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and financial aid and the production of false declarations or documents
relating to these infringements and new offenses. 106
Transfer of proceedings is contemplated whenever a member state,
having jurisdiction under its own law, considers itself unable, even when
having recourse to extradition, to prosecute a person alleged to have committed one of the infringements listed above; in that case, proceedings may
be transferred to the member state in which the person concerned habitually resides or the member state in which he is present. 107 Subsidiary
jurisdiction is vested in the state to which proceedings are transferred. 108
For the new offenses created by the protocol, 109 no specific definition of
the crimes under Community law is given. Instead, the protocol adopts the
process of assimilation with corresponding national provisions. 110 Provision is made for mutual assistance, 111 and the protocol further gives the
Court of Justice competence to issue preliminary rulings. 112
The second convention, the Protocol on the Liability and the Protection
under Criminal Law of Officials and Other Servants of the Community, 113
focuses on extradition. The offenses to which it applies can be summarized
as follows: (a) acceptance of bribes, forgery, circulating forged instruments,
making false statements and misappropriation of funds by civil servants
of the European Communities; (b) breach of professional secrecy by officials and former officials of the Communities and other persons bound by
a formal obligation of secrecy on behalf of the Communities; and (c)
offering bribes to officials of the European Communities. 114 Here too, the
process of assimilation with the corresponding national offense has been
used. 115 Priority of jurisdiction is given to the state of which the accused
is a national, but the proceedirigs can be transferred to the state where the
offense was committed. 116 The emphasis, however, remains on extradition. 117 Finally, the protocol gives the Court of Justice competence to issue
preliminary rulings in the same way as the other protocol. 118
It is too early to appraise the two protocols, as they are still under
discussion. The Council of the Communities has submitted both drafts to
the European Parliament. In its report of January 3, 1979, the Parliament
suggested a number of valuable amendments to the original proposals of
the Commission. 119 The Council subsequently established a new working
group to give the protocols further consideration. So far, however, little
progress has been made. The work on the second protocol (protection
under criminal law of civil servants) has been provisionally tabled and the
ad hoc working group is now focusing on the first protocol (protection under
criminal law of Community financial interests). It is highly unlikely, however, that a consensus can be reached in the short run, as there are still a
number of fundamental issues on which no agreement exists. These indude: the scope of the protocol; the relative merits of adopting the territoriality principle or the personality principle as the main basis for
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jurisdiction; the relative merits of emphasizing extradition or transfer of
criminal proceedings as the most suitable instrument for interstate cooperation; the propriety of preliminary jurisdiction being conferred upon the
Court of Justice for questions arising under the Protocol; and, concomitantly, the question of the legal basis for the draft itself. 120
Recently, the member states of the European Communities envisaged
the elaboration of a network of general conventions on international cooperation in criminal matters, including extradition, judicial assistance, transfer of criminal proceedings, execution of foreign penal judgments and
transfer of sentenced persons. The regulation of these procedures on a
common basis for all the member states would, it was submitted, make the
Communities into one single European legal area, or espace judiciaireeuropden,
to use the words of its founding father, the former French president, Val6ry
Giscard d'Estaing. This concept differed from the efforts described above
in two major respects. First, the project espace judidaire europien, grew out of
the idea of combatting terrorism, but was intended to encompass all common crimes; as such, it was much broader than the ongoing efforts described above, which are restricted to a specific category of crimes-certain
economic crimes against Community interests. Second, the legal basis for
the creation of the espacejudiciaireeuropien was not found within, but outside
the treaties establishing the Communities. The espace would be gradually
set up within the framework of political cooperation between the member
states. Therefore, unlike the efforts described above, no role was reserved
for the Commission or the European Parliament in the elaboration of the
treaties, and no competence was to be conferred upon the Court of Justice
for their interpretation.
Only the "first step" toward the creation of the espacejudiciairewas taken:
on December 4, 1979, the Agreement Between the Member States of the
European Communities for the Application of the European Convention
on the Suppression of Terrorism was signed. 121 This agreement contemplates a more flexible application within the Communities of the Council
of Europe's anti-terrorism convention of 1977. 122 As it requires the ratification of all member states, it is all but impossible that this agreement will
ever enter into force, since France has declared its intention not to ratify
it before the adoption of the Draft Convention on Cooperation in Criminal
Matters. 123 This draft convention, which would have been the second step
toward the espace judiciaire, was never adopted. Its signature by the Heads
of State of the members of the Communities, scheduled for June 1980,
never took place because the Netherlands refused further cooperation.
Since both signature and ratification of all member states were required,
the Convention, and together with it the whole project, ran aground.
The effort to establish an espacejudiciaireeuropien has been rightly criticized
for various reasons. The main legal argument against it is that it does not
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contribute anything new as compared to the already existing conventions
of the Council of Europe 124 and that therefore member states of the
European Communities should ratify those conventions instead of adopting new, almost identical Community conventions. 125 The main political
argument against the espace judiciaire europden focuses on its organizations
outside the framework of the Communities. The role and influence of Community institutions was deliberately avoided; both the Parliament and the
Commission were kept out of the negotiation of the treaties, and no role
was given to the Court of Justice. 126 Another fundamental objection is
that the instrument of political cooperation between the member states
was being abused by its use for internal purposes, whereas the political
cooperation was meant as a tool for the coordination of the external policies of the member states. 127
Especially because the matter under consideration-cooperation in
criminal matters-is so strongly related to fundamental rights and liberties,
I believe that the Communities are not the appropriate regional context for
the elaboration of general conventional arrangements in the field of criminal law. 128 As long as the problem of the protection of fundamental rights
in the Communities has not been settled, 129 the Commu:'ity member
states should implement the existing criminal law conventions of the
Council of Europe by signing and ratifying them.

FINAL OBSERVATIONS
The foregoing plainly illustrates the great difficulties in developing common transnational rules of a penal character, both substantive and procedural, even in a pre-federal regional context such as the European
Communities. As De Keersmaeker has observed:
Criminal law is not only an area in which there are the widest possible
divergences between the legal systems of the Member States but it is also one
which affects vitally the liberty of the citizen and the order and security of
the state, and therefore is regarded as particularly a matter of national sovereignty. 130
For the moment, the European Communities are going through a very
difficult period, perhaps a real crisis. Many of the ambitious objectives
contemplated by the founding fathers in the early 1950s have only been
partly realized, at best. As the political divergences among the member
states have steadily increased over the past few years, it is unlikely that
there will be considerable progress in the near future. In such a situation,
problems which were overlooked, postponed, or simply not dealt with
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when the treaties establishing the Communities were drafted (when the
political willingness to solve these problems was relatively great) have
little or no chance of being resolved under the present circumstances. This
may explain the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the experts who have
been working on the drafts concerning the penal protection of certain
Community interests since the early 1960s. In this respect, the effort to
create an espace judiciaire europien outside the institutional framework of the
Communities has rightly been characterized an alibi, meant to hide the
more fundamental contradictions existing among the member states. 131
As the solution of all the problems described above will undoubtedly
be a time-consuming process, the easy way out in the short run would be
for the member states of the European Communities to ratify the already
existing Council of Europe conventions on cooperation in criminal matters.
This would allow the member states to fill in many of the lacunae described
above. This does not preclude the continuation of ongoing efforts to develop an appropriate system for certain economic crimes, in particular by
developing comprehensive and uniform statutory prohibitions in each of
the member states.
While the ultimate objective should remain the further elaboration and
adoption of the protocols which are presently under consideration, a number of problems could be resolved in the short run-unilaterally, by the
states, or on the Community level, by means of Community regulations
or directives. Mulder has formulated a number of interesting suggestions
in this respect: a directive, based on Article 100 of the E.E.C. Treaty could
be issued, which would oblige states to apply their penal laws to corresponding offenses in other member states; similarly, a regulation or directive could impose upon member states the duty to grant judicial assistance
to one another in criminal cases involving the application of community
rules. 132
It may be that the problem of developing common rules for the suppression of certain offenses against the Communities is just another "childhood
disease" on the way to economic and ultimately political integration. Its
solution depends largely on the solution of the other, more fundamental
issues causing the present crisis in the Communities.
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